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NOTES
FREE EXERCISE RIGHTS OF CAPITAL JURORS
Brian Galle
The Supreme Court has said that the Constitution permits trialjudges
to exclude from the pool of potential capital trialjurors any persons whose
views on the death penalty would likely substantially impair their ability to
reach an impartial verdict. This Note argues that the Court's analysis to
date is incomplete, in that it omits close evaluation of potential conflicts
between such exclusions and the Free Exercise Clause. The Note arguesfurther that a court should apply strict scrutiny to any state action, such as
exclusion for cause, that burdens the use of religious beliefs in the mental
processes of jurors. The Note then weighs several possible government interests that might be offered to meet the test of heightened scrutiny, ultimately
finding them each likely to fail. It concludes by suggesting a revisedformulation of the present standard that provides more protectionfor the religious
liberty of prospectivejurors.
INTRODUCTION

Convicted murderers in the United States may not be sentenced to
death either arbitrarily or automatically, by default or by pure discretion.
Instead, according to a series of Supreme Court decisions beginning in
the early 1970s, every defendant is entitled to an individualized determination, based upon certain morally relevant factors, whether he is to live
or die. In most states, and in federal death penalty proceedings, a jury
makes this determination, sometimes with review by the trial judge.
Judges generally must instruct sentencing juries that they are not free to
reach their decision based wholly upon their own set of values; rather,
there are a predetermined collection of "aggravating" and "mitigating"
factors the jury is to balance in weighing whether or not to impose a
sentence of death. This structure arises primarily out of concerns that
unguided jury decisionmaking tends to mirror what society at large considers irrelevant or illegitimate considerations, such as the race of the
defendant or the victim.
The criminal trial process has several other mechanisms for cabining
the decisions of jurors. Perhaps the most potent of these devices is the
act of jury selection itself. By controlling which jurors get to decide a
case, the state and the parties to a trial can also influence the jury's ultimate deliberative process. For instance, since we all generally agree that
a defendant should not be convicted simply because the jurors have a
personal grudge against her, we allow the judge to "exclude" jurors who
are found to harbor such biases. This kind of jury control is known as
exclusion "for cause." A second type of pretrial jury control is referred to
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as the "peremptory challenge," because the parties exercising it do not
have to give any real reason for their choices.1
Unsurprisingly, the limits of what constitutes a permissible "cause"
for exclusion are fuzzy and often fiercely debated, especially when the
stakes are life and death. The Supreme Court's first modern take on
challenges to prospective capital jurors came in 1968, when the Court
condemned the practice of empanelling the so-called "hanging jury." Although its opinion aimed mainly at defining impermissible exclusion of
jurors, the Court also implied that jurors who avowed that they would
refuse to impose death in any circumstance could constitutionally be excluded for cause without violating the rights of the defendant. 2 Since
then, the Court has expanded on this implication, finding that any juror
whose "views [on the death penalty] would 'prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath"' can be excluded for cause. 3 The same standard
4
applies to jurors who would in most instances favor the death penalty.

Absent from this line of cases, though, is any consideration of
whether exclusion of jurors whose views on the death penalty rest on religious grounds unconstitutionally infringes upon the free exercise rights
of the excluded jurors.5 This Note argues that the "substantial impair1. In fact, the peremptory challenge now has some limits; if it looks as if a party is
using its peremptory challenges in a way that discriminates on the basis of race or gender,
it can be forced to give "neutral" reasons for the strikes. See, e.g.,J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (barring gender discrimination in use of peremptories by
state on behalf of minor); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986) (holding
unconstitutional racially discriminatory peremptory challenges by state prosecutor).
2. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968).
3. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 & n.5 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448
U.S. 38, 45 (1980)).
4. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992). See infra note 27.
5. Several state courts have considered whether for-cause exclusion of these jurors
would violate either federal or state constitutional protections of religious liberty. The
North Carolina Supreme Court rejected first a federal free exercise claim, and later a state
due process religious liberty claim, explaining in both cases that exclusion was properly
based on jurors' "inability to follow the law" rather than on improper discrimination. State
v. Warren, 499 S.E.2d 431, 442 (N.C. 1998) (quoting State v. Davis, 386 S.E.2d 418, 427
(N.C. 1989)). The same logic has been used to reject challenges to exclusions of religious
objectors under the Tennessee Constitution. See State v. Jones, 789 S.W.2d 545, 547
(Tenn. 1990); State v. Bobo, 727 S.W.2d 945, 949 (Tenn. 1987); Wolf v. Sundquist, 955
S.W.2d 626, 631 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).
New Mexico has reached a similar result in interpreting its constitutional proviso that
"[tihe right of any citizen of the state to ... sit upon juries, shall never be restricted,
abridged or impaired on account of religion." N.M. Const. art. VII, § 3; see State v. Clark,
990 P.2d 793, 802-03 (N.M. 1999) (finding no violation where exclusion based on
opposition to death penalty represents juror's inability to perform duty rather than
exclusion based upon religious opinion or affiliation).
The United States Supreme Court has found that use of peremptory-as opposed to
for-cause-challenges, by either the state or by private parties, systematically to exclude
potential jurors on the basis of their race or sex impermissibly violates the rights of citizens
to serve on ajury. SeeJE.B., 511 U.S. at 129; Batson, 476 U.S. at 100. Some commentators
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ment" standard, in failing to recognize that there are important differences for First Amendment purposes 6 between jurors who would always
vote for or against the death penalty and those who are only likely or
inclined to do so, permits states unconstitutionally to exclude some jurors. 7 Part I explains how the narrowing of what was once an expansive
have argued that use of peremptory challenges based on religious affiliation should also be
prohibited by Batson principles. See Cheryl G. Bader, Batson Meets the First Amendment:
Prohibiting Peremptory Challenges That Violate a Prospective Juror's Speech and
Association Rights, 24 Hofstra L. Rev. 567, 593-601 (1996); Morris B. Hoffman,
Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge's Perspective, 64 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 809,839 (1997); AngelaJ. Mason, Note, Discrimination Based on Religious Affiliation:
Another Nail in the Peremptory Challenge's Coffin?, 29 Ga. L. Rev. 493, 521-25 (1995).
But see J. Suzanne Bell Chambers, Applying the Break: Religion and the Peremptory
Challenge, 70 Ind. L.J. 569, 570 (1995) (arguing against extension of Batson). So far, only
a few courts have taken up the invitation. See United States v. Greer, 939 F.2d 1076, 1086
(5th Cir. 1991) (holding that Batson limits "race, religion, and national-origin-based
peremptory challenges"); State v. Gilmore, 511 A.2d 1150, 1157 (N.J. 1986) (claiming that
Batson would apply to strikes based on either race or religion). But see, e.g., State v. Davis,
504 N.W.2d 767, 768-71 (Minn. 1993) (ruling that Batson doctrine does not apply to
religion). A pair of commentators have mentioned for-cause exclusion obliquely,
suggesting that it would be permissible where peremptory challenges of jurors based on
religion would not. See Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Note, Religion-Based Peremptory
Challenges After Batson v. Kentucky and JE.B. v. Alabama: An Equal Protection and First
Amendment Analysis, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 191, 211-12 (1995); Gary C. Furst, Note, Will the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act Be Strike Three Against Peremptory Challenges?, 30
Val. U. L. Rev. 701, 743-44 (1996).
6. While the First Amendment argument developed in this Note relies in some part
on fundamental notions, such as freedom of thought, that might be said to underlie both
the religion and speech clauses, see infra text accompanying notes 52-58, it focuses
doctrinally only on the potential free exercise claim. As a result, this Note does not address
the possibility that a strongly politically motivated or merely racist juror might make similar
arguments to gain admission to ajury from which she would otherwise be barred. An indepth exploration of the distinguishing features between the three situations from a moral
viewpoint-for instance, whether as a matter of political philosophy faith-based reasoning
is especially desirable or undesirable in capital sentencing-is an important discussion, but
one well beyond the scope of this Note. For a general discussion of the intersections
between legal and religious modes of thought, see Kent Greenawalt, Private Consciences
and Public Reasons 159-63 (1995) (considering whether legislators and citizens ought to
rely on religious or other "comprehensive" views in making political judgments).
Pragmatically speaking, though, a free exercise claim might succeed here where a
viewpoint discrimination-type claim has already failed. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S.
162, 175-76 (1986) (rejecting claim that jurors opposed to death penalty represent a
distinctive group subject to discrimination by for-cause exclusion). As this Note's focus on
the doctrine demonstrates, free exercise claims present a distinctive set of interests to be
balanced-interests simply not considered in the Witherspoon-Wainwrightline of cases. Free
exercise also has never been narrowed by a "limited public forum" exception in the way
political speech has.
7. Although in theory a juror could bring a suit for enforcement of these claimsunder 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000), for example-the more common situation will be one in
which one of the parties will raise a challenge to exclusion on the juror's behalf. The
Supreme Court has approved this practice, despite the possible standing issues it raises,
because jurors will rarely have a sufficient incentive to undertake the costs of litigation on
their own behalf. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 55-56 (1992).
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role for juror discretion led to the development of the substantial impairment rule. Part II begins the First Amendment analysis of the substantial
impairment standard by considering what level of scrutiny would be applied under prevailing free exercise doctrine. This Part argues that exclusion of jurors based on their statement of religiously motivated opinions
is not controlled by the leading case, Employment Division v. Smith.8 Relying on both explicit and implicit exceptions to Smith, this Part concludes
that a showing of compelling government interest is needed to sustain
the rule. Part III examines several possible government interests and
weighs them against the demands of strict scrutiny. This Note concludes
that these potential interests, while perhaps justifying exclusion of jurors
who are absolutely for or against the death penalty, are insufficient to
survive heightened scrutiny in the case of jurors who are only "substantially impaired."'
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE WAINWRIGHT STANDARD

Until 1972, many states left the decision whether or not to impose a
death sentence to what was, in effect, the unguided discretion of the jurors.' 0 In that year, though, the Supreme Court declared that the death
penalty was unconstitutional as administered by the State of Georgia."I
Although Georgia's statute was putatively aimed at allowing sentencing
based on moral factors, in fact the jurors were permitted the "uncontrolled discretion" to impose a sentence for whatever reason moved
them.' 2 While the Court was deeply divided as to its rationale, five Justices did agree that at a minimum such wide discretion was too likely to
result in arbitrary and possibly racist application of the death penalty:
"Under these laws no standards govern the selection of the penalty. People live or die, dependent on the whim of one man or of 12. '' 13 Thus, the
law violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment: "It would seem to be incontestable that the death penalty inflicted on one defendant is 'unusual' if it discriminates against him
by reason of his race, religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it is
imposed under a procedure that gives room for the play of such
14
prejudices."
In response to Furman, Georgia and the other states revised their
capital punishment statutes to impose limits and guidance on jury deci8. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
9. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. at 412, 424 (1985). In general, this conclusion applies
to jurors who are inclined either for or against a death verdict. However, because of the
structure of most death penalty statutes, the argument forjurors who favor death is weaker.
See infra Part III.B.1.
10. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 252-53 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
I. Id. at 239-40 (per curiam).
12. Id. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 242.
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sions. Many of these reforms followed the example of the Model Penal
Code in establishing a set of permitted "aggravating" and "mitigating"
factors that a judge or jury is required to weigh. The decisionmaker is
sometimes also required to make explicit which factors were relied upon
in reaching the ultimate decision. 15 Four years after Furman, the Court
approved a revised Georgia statute that set out an exclusive list of ten
aggravating factors that could support a verdict of death, but allowed consideration of mitigating and individually insufficient aggravating factors
as "otherwise authorized by law."' 6 In upholding Georgia's sentencing
scheme, the Court repeatedly emphasized the importance of detailed,
17
binding instructions to the jury.
For all of the Court's emphasis on guidance and careful instruction,
it is significant that the Georgia statute leaves substantial opportunities
for jurors to employ their individualized judgment.' 8 Indeed, the Court
has subsequently held that the use of individualized moral assessments of
death penalty defendants is not only permissible but mandatory. 19 Fundamental respect for individual human dignity, embodied in the Eighth
Amendment, "requires consideration of the character and record of the
individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a
constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty
20
of death."
Thus, a death penalty juror seems bound by a pair of arguably contradictory obligations. On the one hand, she must follow her conscience,
in assuring that each defendant receives particularized moral consideration of his unique human circumstances. On the other hand, she must
also follow "fixed rules of law." 2 Of course, the two demands do not
necessarily conflict, especially if there is widespread agreement in society
22
about the moral system undergirding the rules of law.
15. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193 (1976).
16. Id. at 164-66. The present Georgia statute is identical in all significant respects.
See Ga. Code Ann. § 17-10-30 to -31.1. (1997).
17. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193, 195.
18. See id. at 164 ("The scope of the nonstatutory aggravating or mitigating
circumstances is not delineated in the statute.").
19. See McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 442 (1990) ("The Constitution requires
States to allow consideration of mitigating evidence in capital cases."); Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-16 (1982) (reversing death sentence where trial judge had
refused to consider defendant's family history as a mitigating factor); Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion) (concluding that "the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be
precluded from considering, as a mitigatingfactor, any aspect of a defendant's character or
record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers") (citation
omitted); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-05 (1976) (opinion of Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
20. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
21. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193.
22. There is a lively scholarly debate about the compatibility of rule-based criminal
systems with the expression of community moral sense. See, e.g., Alan C. Michaels,

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 101:569

These changes brought a corresponding shift in the law of capital
jury selection. Under the pre-Furman regime, the Court had held that
the state had an interest in excluding for cause at voir dire only those
jurors who would "automatically" reject the death penalty, regardless of
the facts of the case. 23 In 1985, the Court expanded the class of excludable jurors to include those whose views would "prevent or substantially
impair the performance of [their] duties as a juror in accordance with
[their] instructions and [their] oath. '24 Jurors, Justice Rehnquist explained, must "apply the law."25 Before Furman, the law required only
that jurors at least contemplate imposition of the death penalty. Now,
however, they are required also to follow a statutorily prescribed procedure in making their decisions. Thus, the Court concluded, a juror
whose views would likely "substantially impair" his performance as a juror-i.e., ajuror who would not follow the procedure-was also likely not
"apply[ing] the law."2 6 The same standard applies whether the juror is
"Rationales" of Criminal Law Then and Now: For aJudgmental Descriptivism, 100 Colum.
L. Rev. 54, 66-71 (2000) (summarizing the opposing views).
23. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968); accord Davis v. Georgia,
429 U.S. 122, 123 (1976). Voir dire is the process by which a judge or, on occasion, the
attorneys for parties examine prospective jurors.
24. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985). Justice Rehnquist suggests that the
"substantially impair[ed]" standard had already been set out in an earlier case, Adams v.
Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980). He acknowledges, though, that before Witt there was
considerable confusion among lower courts as to whether the Witherspoon or the Adams test
was in force, or whether there was any meaningful difference between the two in view of
the fact that Adams had found exclusion improper. Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 421.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 424, 426; see also John H. Garvey & Amy V. Coney, Catholic Judges in
Capital Cases, 81 Marq. L. Rev. 303, 338 (1998) ("The problem with [a juror who would
automatically vote to impose the death penalty] is not that he reaches a forbidden
conclusion. It is that he refuses to go through the process required to get there.").
There is some ambiguity in Justice Rehnquist's opinion about how certain a judge
must be that ajuror will be "substantially impair[ed]." While he is clear that impairment
need not be found with "unmistakable clarity," a few lines later he seems to endorse
exclusion where a judge is merely "left with the definite impression" that a juror will not
apply the law. Id. at 424-26. Attempts by other courts to further refine the level of
certainty have been inconclusive. Compare, e.g., Riley v. State, 889 S.W.2d 290, 301 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1993) (en banc) (ruling that ajuror who presents a "substantial likelihood that
he will balk at the task or falsify an answer" can be excluded for cause), with Farris v.
Johnson, 967 F. Supp. 200, 207-08 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (arguing that Riley represents an
incorrect interpretation of federal law). While a few courts have attempted to fashion
bright-line rules for certain types ofjurors, there remains wide variation among state and
federal courts in the minimum level of "impairment" that can justify exclusion. For
instance, jurors who seem only to lean towards a given verdict are sometimes excludable
and sometimes not. Compare United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803, 812 (4th Cir. 2000)
(excluding juror who stated "[i]f given the two choices, I would weigh heavily on not
wanting to go the death penalty") (alteration in original), with United States v. Hall, 152
F.3d 381, 409-10 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that venireperson who leaned toward death did
not have to be excluded),Jarrell v. State, 413 S.E.2d 710, 712 (Ga. 1992) (same), and State
v. Lucky, 755 So. 2d 845, 849-51 (La. 1999) (finding that venire member who would
require "pretty heavy evidence" of mitigation to render life sentence was properly seated
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predisposed to vote for or against death. 27 The question for this Note
will be whether the incremental protection of "the law" achieved by this
rule is a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify restrictions of a
First Amendment free exercise right.
II. THE

INTERESTS Or THE JUROR

This Part considers what level of scrutiny should be applied to-and,
correspondingly, the strength of the state interest needed to justify-forcause exclusion of religiously motivated capital jurors. After considering
briefly the possibility that such exclusion constitutes religious discrimination, this Part turns to examining the leading precedents on laws of general applicability that have the incidental effect of burdening religious
exercise. It concludes by finding that heightened scrutiny is likely for
incidental-burden laws that target belief rather than actions.
on jury). Courts have also disagreed as to whether jurors who simply say they are unsure
they could follow the law are properly excused. Compare Gall v. Parker, 231 F.3d 265,
331-32 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding trial court's exclusion ofjuror "uncertain[ ] as to how the
option of a death sentence would affect his decision" was error), with Castro v. Ward, 138
F.3d 810, 824-25 (10th Cir. 1998) (upholding exclusion ofjuror who "[did] not know...
whether she [could] give the death penalty"), Alley v. Bell, 101 F. Supp. 2d 588, 652-53
(W.D. Tenn. 2000) (excluding juror who stated he was unsure he could follow law), and
State v. Gentry, 888 P.2d 1105, 1143-44 (Wash. 1995) (en banc) (upholding exclusion of
uncertain juror). Lastly, there are sharp divisions over whether a juror whose answers
appear to indicate a firm view towards capital punishment, but who nonetheless avers he or
she would still follow the judge's instructions, must be excluded. Compare State v.
Anderson, 4 P.3d 369, 374-75 (Ariz. 2000) (en banc) (ruling that juror who wrote both
that she could not impose death and that she would follow law was not necessarily
excludable without further questioning), and Clark v. State, 929 S.W.2d 5, 8-9 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1996) (en banc) (holding jurors who state unequivocally that they will obey the
judge's instructions must be admitted), with State v. Griffin, 741 A.2d 913, 936 (Conn.
1999) (sustaining exclusion ofjuror who stated that while she would not vote for a death
penalty she "would follow the law").
The end result of this doctrinal uncertainty is that, as a practical matter, the trial
judge's decision is essentially discretionary. The judge's assessment of the juror is deemed
a factual determination, with attendant deference from any reviewing court. See
Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 429; Gall, 231 F.3d at 331; Hale v. Gibson, 227 F.3d 1298, 1318
(10th Cir. 2000); Barnette, 211 F.3d at 812-13; Spivey v. Head, 207 F.3d 1263, 1275 (lth
Cir. 2000); State v. Longworth, 438 S.E.2d 219, 222 (S.C. 1993); Colburn v. State, 966
S.W.2d 511, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc); Gentry, 888 P.2d at 1143. Judges who
are so inclined have great power to control the makeup of the jury with little fear of close
appellate review of their determinations.
27. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992). There might be an overly literal
reading of Morgan in which only jurors who would "automatically vote for the death
penalty in every case" are excludable. Id. That reading overlooks the fact that Morgan
makes no effort to distinguish pro-death jurors from jurors opposed to capital punishment,
for whom the Court previously had developed a sophisticated rationale justifying exclusion
even when the juror gave only the "definite impression" she would be unlikely to vote for
death. Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424-26; see supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
Indeed, far from rejecting Wainwright, Morgan explicitly adopts its reasoning. Morgan, 504
U.S. at 734-35.
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A. PrevailingSupreme Court Free Exercise Doctrine

Modern claims of free exercise violations are largely governed by Employment Division v. Smith, a 1990 Supreme Court decision sharply limiting
the shelter provided by the Free Exercise Clause against laws of general
applicability. 28 Alfred Smith and Galen Black were fired from their jobs
at a drug rehabilitation center because, as part of their participation in a
Native American Church ritual, they consumed peyote, an illegal hallucinogen. The State of Oregon subsequently denied Smith and Black unemployment benefits, finding that they had been terminated for "misconduct," and Smith and Black sued. By the time their case reached the
Supreme Court for a second time, in 1989, the main question was
whether or not Oregon's refusal to exempt religious users of peyote from
29
its drug laws violated the Free Exercise Clause.
The Court rejected Smith and Black's challenge, announcing what
30
was, arguably, a broad reinterpretation of free exercise jurisprudence.
In an opinion by Justice Scalia that seemed to follow closely the centuryold case of Reynolds v. United States,31 the Court held that where a burden
is "merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise
valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended."3 2 Thus,
any law that affected conduct engaged in for both religious and nonreligious purposes would not receive the heightened scrutiny that at least
some laws burdening religious activity had often been subject to in the
past.3 3 In fact, since the majority opinion moves directly from its rejection of the compelling interest test to an affirmation of Oregon's decision
to deny benefits, 3 4 it appears that Smith does not permit even rational
28. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). For the most part, this Note accepts Smith uncritically.
Readers interested in more intensive evaluation of the decision are recommended to
Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1 (critiquing the
theoretical conceptions upon which Smith relies and surveying the broader impact of the
decision); William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 308 (1991) (acknowledging some jurisprudential failings but defending policy
results of Smith); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith
Decision, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1109 (1990) (criticizing Smith as methodologically problematic
and philosophically inconsistent with underlying premises of First Amendment).
29. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874-76.
30. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 907-08 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); McConnell, supra note
28, at 1120-28.
31. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). In Reynolds, the Supreme Court upheld against a free exercise
challenge a federal law prohibiting bigamy and polygamy in the Utah territory. After
examining the history of the First Amendment, the Court concluded that while "Congress
was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion," it remained free to control
"actions which [are] in violation of social duties or subversive of good order." Id. at 164.
Where regulating marriage was within the power of Congress, the Court decided, no
individual could claim exemption from generally applicable marriage laws.
32. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
33. See id. at 907 & n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
34. See id. at 888-90.
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basis review of neutral, generally applicable state activity challenged on
35
free exercise grounds.
It is, however, still possible to make viable free exercise claims. Smith
36
itself includes exceptions to its general prohibition against balancing.
The next section considers the viability of these loopholes.
B. Does Smith Apply to For-CauseExclusion of Jurors?
1. Religious Discrimination.- Although Smith limits the force of free
exercise claims against neutral laws of general applicability, it acknowledges that state action "specifically directed at ... religious practice[s]"
would likely violate the Constitution.3 7 This exception embraces both
statutes that target religion on their face 38 -for example, by barring ministers from holding public office 39-as well as those that are so underinclusive it can fairly be said that they operate upon "acts or abstentions
only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of
40
the religious belief that they display."
While challenged jurors might suggest that for-cause exclusion is
facially discriminatory, they are unlikely to succeed. The initial claim
would probably look something like Batson: "You found out I have deeply
held religious beliefs, and then you moved to remove me for cause."
There is, though, a major difference between the Batson prohibition and
the for-cause exclusion of, for example, Catholics who state that they
35. Cf. id. at 889 n.5 ("[I]t is horrible to contemplate that federal judges will regularly
balance against the importance of general laws the significance of religious practice.").
For a scholarly argument to the same effect, see Jonathan C. Lipson, On Balance:
Religious Liberty and Third-Party Harms, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 589, 643 (2000).
36. In addition, Congress made a short-lived effort to overturn Smith through a piece
of legislation, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
Although the Court struck down RFRA as it applied to the states, see City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997), there might be an argument that RFRA still binds the
federal government. Cf. In reYoung, 141 F.3d 854, 861 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that RFRA
demonstrates Congress's intent to "modify the United States bankruptcy laws" to provide
heightened statutory protection for religious liberty); Carol M. Kaplan, Note, The Devil is
in the Details: Neutral, Generally Applicable Laws and Exceptions from Smith, 75 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 1045, 1063-64 (2000) (noting doctrinal uncertainty).
37. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878; see also id. at 886 n.3 ("[W]e strictly scrutinize
governmental classifications based on religion.").
38. See id. at 877 (citing Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 245 (1982); McDaniel v.
Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); Fowler v. Rhode Island,
345 U.S. 67, 69 (1953); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-88 (1944)).
39. See McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 619.
40. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877 (emphasis added); accord Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 537-40 (1993). Lukumi dealt with the claim by
members of the Santeria faith, whose practices include animal sacrifice, that a city
ordinance limiting animal slaughter was so underinclusive as to constitute discrimination.
The city's rules contained exceptions not only for commercial slaughter but also for other
religious killings-kosher slaughter, for instance. In effect, it was only illegal to kill
animals when the killing was part of a Santeria ritual.
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could not impose the death penalty in any circumstance. 4 1 Where the
peremptory challenge cases forbid exclusion of jurors solely because of
their race, the Catholic juror is arguably excluded not because of his religion, but because of his views. Not everyone who considers himself a
Catholic adheres to every position put forward by the Pope, and, as the
Court has recognized, even the religious zealot may "nonetheless
subordinate his personal views to what he perceive [s] to be his duty to
abide by his oath as a juror and to obey the law of the State. '42 Under
Wainwright and the related cases, jurors are excludable where their views,
whatever the origin of the views, substantially impair their ability to follow
the court's instructions. 4 3 Thus, a juror excluded not merely because of
her religious affiliation, but because she indicates that she would not be
willing to subordinate her personal views, arguably has not been classified
44
according to her religion.
Nor is it likely that a court would accept the claim that for-cause
exclusion is so underinclusive as to be "directed at" religion. The practice of excluding biased jurors is underinclusive to some extent, in that it
is probably impossible to detect and exclude all jurors who have an undesirable bias. 45 A very broad view of "religion" might also make the pool of
41. In addition to the Catholic Church, Quakers, Unitarians and Universalists, and
certain other Protestant and Jewish denominations, have all denounced the death penalty
at various times. See The Churches Speak On: Capital Punishment (J. Gordon Melton
ed., 1989); Garvey & Coney, supra note 26, at 303-04.
42. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 514 n.7 (1968). For a thoughtful argument
that Catholic judges, at least, should refuse to take part in most aspects of capital trials, see
Garvey & Coney, supra note 26, at 306-31.
43. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985). It may be, though, that the
decision not to defer to the state is itself premised on a religious belief-for instance, if the
juror's religion asserts that individuals have an obligation to elevate their spiritual
obligations above their secular duties. It might be possible to respond to this argument by
saying that it misses the point: Exclusion is not because of the religious choice qua
religious choice, but simply because the juror's answers are within the category of"biased"
responses.
44. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997) ("When the exercise of
religion has been burdened in an incidental way by a law of general application, it does not
follow that the persons affected have been burdened any more than other citizens, let
alone burdened because of their religious beliefs.") (emphasis added); Gillette v. United
States, 401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971) (holding that conscription statute that fails to allow
conscientious objector status for those with religious scruples only as to select wars does
not target any particular theological position, even though some religions teach that
followers must not engage in unjust wars); State v. Willoughby, 892 P.2d 1319, 1335 (Ariz.
1995) (in banc); State v. Warren, 499 S.E.2d 431, 442 (N.C. 1998); Kent Greenawalt, All or
Nothing at All: The Defeat of Selective Conscientious Objection, 1971 Sup. Ct. Rev. 31,
73-75, 82-90.
45. The argument, elaborated in infra Part III.A, that "bias" will rarely be relevant to
death penalty jurors, might also undermine the identification of for-cause exclusion as
"neutral." If the secular policy advanced to justify a law of general applicability is
nonsensical, a court might be inclined to find it a pretext for religious discrimination. See
Gillette, 401 U.S. at 453-54. Although preventing bias is not a sufficiently weighty state
interest to overcome strict scrutiny, see infra Part III.A, it probably is strong enough to say
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jurors who are excluded for nonreligious bias relatively small. Even this
showing, though, is not enough to survive Smith, which demands that religious activity be targeted "only when ... engaged in for religious reasons."4 6 Under this prong of Smith, then, a court would not find exclusion for cause as deserving of heightened scrutiny.
2. Belief and Conduct. - By its terms, Smith purports to apply only to
laws that regulate acts. 4 7 Indeed, any comments that the Court made on
any other score would be dicta, since, as it acknowledges, there was "no
contention that Oregon's drug law represents an attempt to regulate religious beliefs [or] the communication of religious beliefs." 4 8 Instead,
the majority relies upon the rule set out in Reynolds, where Chief Justice
Waite acknowledged frankly that "the legislative powers of the government reach actions only, and not opinions. '49 Of course, jurors are not
excludable simply for believing that the death penalty is inappropriate;
they are excused for saying during voir dire that they would not set aside
this belief. Is their speech an "action"?
We might resolve this question without resorting to the ample free
speech precedent on the topic. 50 If beliefs are to be protected from discrimination, and if, in general, beliefs are unknowable (and, hence, incapable of being subjected to discrimination) unless expressed through
some means, then there must be at least some minimum form of communicating beliefs that is treated as if it were part and parcel of the belief
itself, even if in fact we know that it is distinct. This principle does not
that it "exists," which is all that is required under Gillette to meet the test of neutrality.
Gillette, 401 U.S. at 454.
46. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (emphasis added); Gillette,
401 U.S. at 453-54; Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 580-82 (1944) (Roberts,
J., dissenting) (asserting that the First Amendment does not protect religion from
"nonoppressive" and "nondiscriminatory" taxation). But see In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561,
576-78 (1945) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that Illinois state bar rule requiring oath to
support state constitution targeted religion, where applicant's refusal to take oath was
based on his religious objection to conscription, and he was otherwise qualified for
membership); Kenneth D. Sansom, Note, Sharing the Burden: Exploring the Space
Between Uniform and Specific Applicability in Current Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 77
Tex. L. Rev. 753, 769-70 (1999) (arguing that Lukumi implies that secular departures from
a general statutory scheme must be "matched" by exemptions for religious exercise).
Although the Sansom Note makes a good argument, it probably is inconsistent with the
plain language of Smith and Gillette.
47. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79 ("We have never held that an individual's religious
beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct ....
'Laws,' we said, 'are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere
with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices."' (quoting Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878))); see also Boerne, 521 U.S. at 539 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (claiming Smith stands for the proposition that religious exercise "shall be
permitted so long as it does not violate general laws governing conduct").
48. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.
49. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Nehemiah
Dodge and Others, a Committee of Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802)).
50. For a concise summary of that precedent, see Laurence H. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law 825-32 (2d ed. 1988).

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 101:569

require protection of every mode of expression; if we want to minimize
the damage to our sense of the real distinction between act and belief, we
could extend protection only to the least "active" means available to make
belief evident in a given circumstance. 51 In any event, we probably would
not need to belabor the point in distinguishing Smith, since again by its
terms the opinion excepts communication of religious beliefs.
The problem with this argument is that the speech of the juror that
is penalized is, in fact, a prediction of action. The juror is describing how
he will likely vote at the end of the trial. Since the court will probably
have no remedy for a biased juror who votes against a death sentence for
reasons other than those laid out in the court's instructions, the only possible way to reach the "action" of the vote is to exclude based on a juror's
speech during voir dire. The success of this counterargument, though,
depends on the assumption that preventing the misguided vote of ajuror
is itself regulating action and not belief or speech. It could be argued
that the juror is, in fact, penalized for saying she will do what otherjurors
do covertly. Alternately, we could observe that the physical fact of one
juror's vote against death is the same as any other's. His hand in the air,
her note on the verdict pad, is the same. In fact, the state is not attempting to regulate the ballot itself at all; the state's interest is unaffected by
whether a prospective juror ultimately votes for or against death. Instead,
thejudge is seeking to control the mental processes of the jurors-ensuring that they follow the prescribed mechanism for deliberatingand deciding
which sentence to impose.
This leaves us with the critical question: If a law regulates mental
activity, is it directed at "belief' or at "action"? There are plausible linguistic arguments in either direction, and Smith does not directly address
the issue. 52 A long tradition of Supreme Court pronouncements and
scholarly commentary holds that the First Amendment announces a right
of freedom of thought and conscience.5 3 Much of the force of this argu51. This is not to claim that such an approach would square with First Amendment
precedent. The point is only that giving religious speech protection coextensive with
religious belief need not obliterate the distinction between action and idea.
52. It appears that no court or commentator has yet considered the possibility that
Smith even contains an implicit "belief' exception, let alone the limits of such an
exception.
53. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (describing free speech as
part of "broader concept of 'individual freedom of mind"' (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943))); Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 68
(1946) (declaring that Bill of Rights represents a "victory for freedom of thought");
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 ("[N]o official ... can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion .... ");id. at 655 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) ("Law is concerned with external behavior and not with the internal life of
man."); Steven J. Heyman, Righting the Balance: An Inquiry into the Foundations and
Limits of Freedom of Expression, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 1275, 1326-27 (1998) (claiming that
freedom of speech includes freedom of thought a fortiori, and that Barnette and its
progeny stand for principle that "[t]he inner self is inviolable; any intrusion into it, or
attempt to expose it to others against its will, does violence to this inner freedom"); Samuel
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ment seems to derive from the libertarian premise that the state's legitimate role begins only "whenever activities begin to affect or collide with
liberties of others or of the public."54 Thus the Court has often described
the opinion/action dichotomy as one demarcated by the line where action is "in violation of social duties or subversive of good order." 55 Yet
this formulation is problematic, since the determination whether even
physical activity violates social duties can be controversial. 56 Another difficulty is that thought, too, can undermine the social order-when it
leads to undesirable outcomes that the law is powerless to prevent before
set in action. Unguided jurors are a perfect example of this phenomenon: If they harbor racist thoughts, they can undermine our goal of
equal protection under the law, and our only opportunity to prevent racist outcomes is to censor the thought-strike the juror from the jury.
57
Strict scrutiny presents an attractive solution to this dilemma.
Mental activity, it has been argued, is harmful only when it is predictive of
or conducive to adverse nonmental outcomes. If we stand with Justice
Jackson in placing a premium on free thought, we ought only to limit the
exercise of religious conscience where the adverse outcomes it portends
D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 193, 195-96
(1890) (arguing that law protects "man's spiritual nature ... his feelings and his intellect").
Laws that seek to regulate thought directly are exceedingly rare, if not nonexistent.
Barnette, for example, was a challenge by a young Jehovah's Witness to compulsory flag
salute. Writing for the majority, JusticeJackson noted that it was unclear whether the state
sought genuinely to require mental obeisance to the flag or only that students "simulate"
it. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633.
These cases illustrate nicely why the Free Speech Clause is not a non sequitur when it
follows on the heels of the religion clauses in the Bill of Rights. There is a certain core of
underlying principles common to most or all of the First Amendment, and cases which
speak to that core can have true doctrinal value no matter whether they begin their analysis
in "speech" or "free exercise." Justice Jackson, for example, never even bothers to decide
under which particular clause Barnette's claim should fall. See id. at 639-42 (analyzing
"the First Amendment to our Constitution").
54. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 177-78 (1944). This was also a Justice
Jackson opinion.
55. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878); see also Employment Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990) (analyzing "government's ability to enforce generally
applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct").
56. Compare Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164-66 (finding evils of polygamyjustify government
regulation), with Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (holding law
outlawing contraceptives intrudes on constitutional right to privacy in marital
relationship). For an argument on the Griswold side, see Lipson, supra note 35, at 591 n.7
(arguing that polygamy and peyote use do not involve public harms); id. at 594 ("[W] here
third parties are likely to be harmed by an exemption, courts should not recognize a
presumption in favor of religious claimants.").
57. "Strict scrutiny," of course, describes the practice by federal courts of requiring
both a compelling state interest and a very close nexus between that end and the means
chosen to accomplish it before sustaining the enactment. See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980) (applying strict scrutiny); First Nat'l Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978) (same); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976)
(per curiam) (same).
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cannot be prevented by regulation on physical activities.5 8 This is precisely what the "least restrictive means" branch of strict scrutiny accomplishes. 59 Thus, the general philosophical thrust of Supreme Court precedent suggests that regulation of mental activity should be exempted
from Smith's bar on balancing for laws prohibiting "conduct" or "actions,"
60
and that strict scrutiny should be applied instead.
3. The Sherbert Exception.

-

Smith also grudgingly permits an excep-

61
tion for cases substantially resembling the facts in Sherbert v. Verner.
Summarizing the Sherbert line, Justice Scalia concludes that "where the
State has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to
extend that system to cases of 'religious hardship' without compelling
reason." 62 In other words, some kinds of governmental decisionmaking
are not laws of "general applicability," in which society's interests as a
whole loom over incidental burdens on individuals; rather, some types of
decisions are designed to consider only the welfare of directly-impacted
individuals. 63 Arguably, Smith preserves Sherbert's suggestion that government may not exclude religion from its list of particularized considera-

58. "Mere" political thought might implicate distinctive and, arguably, less vital issues.
See, e.g., John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 180-94, 475-80 (rev. ed. 1999) (arguing that a
just society must prioritize liberty above the realization of "greater economic and social
benefits"). Thus, there is not necessarily parity in protection for the two.
59. See, e.g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) (reversing conviction for
publicly maligning the flag on the grounds that the statute's goal, to prevent violent
outbreaks, could have been served by a far narrower provision); United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (ruling that law burdening political speech should be
sustained only if "the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest").
60. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879. There have been some suggestions that, rather than strict
scrutiny, the First Amendment should place an absolute bar on laws that seek to control
religious beliefs. See id. ("[L]aws ... cannot interfere with mere religious belief and
opinions .. ")(quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 631-35
(1978) (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that a religious test for office is absolutely
prohibited by the Constitution); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940)
("[T]he amendment embraces two concepts,-freedom to believe and freedom to act.
The first is absolute ....");Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164 ("Congress was deprived of all
legislative power over mere opinion ....
");
Lipson, supra note 35, at 643. But see Wooley
v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715-16 (1977) (applying strict scrutiny test to statute that
arguably limited freedom of mind); Kent Greenawalt, Religion and Fairness: Free
Exercise, ch. 3 at 8-13 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the ColumbiaLaw Review). As
Professor Greenawalt points out, the absolute bar position can be a bitter pill to swallow,
especially where religious belief strongly foreshadows highly undesirable outcomes. Id. In
addition, we seem to take for granted the validity of some criminal laws regulating, or at
least penalizing, thought: Premeditation, for instance, can be an element or aggravator in
a murder charge. Presumably, we believe that the state's interest in preventing calculated
killing is sufficiently vital, and our alternatives slender enough, to support these statutes.
61. 374 U.S. 398 (1963); see Smith, 494 U.S. at 882-85.
62. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
63. For an alternative justification for the Sherbert exception, see Kaplan, supra note
36, at 1081-82. Kaplan argues that the Sherbert exception is intended to guard against the
exercise of "unfettered discretion[ ]" by state actors in a demonstrably discriminatory
manner. Id. I do not read her conclusion-that Sherbert is triggered only when officials
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tions without providing a compelling justification for doing so. 6 4 It might
be possible to argue that juror selection is similarly individualized: A
challenge for cause calls for the judge to exercise discretion on a personby-person basis as to whether, on balance, the interests of society and the
parties are best served by admission of a particular juror. Although Sherbert does not expressly require that states employ the least restrictive
means available, it might be difficult to characterize an interest in a particular scheme as "compelling" when there is another way to accomplish
65
the same goal with less harm.
"discriminate between religious and secular reasons for granting individual exemptions,"
id. at 1083-as inconsistent with the one advanced in this Note.
64. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
537-38 (1993) (holding that within system of individualized governmental assessment,
government may not value religious reasons below secular reasons without compelling
reason); Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359,
364-67 (3d Cir. 1999) (invoking Sherbert exception to require heightened scrutiny of police
department policy permitting medical but not religious exceptions from no-beard rule); cf.
Bette Novit Evans, Interpreting the Free Exercise of Religion: The Constitution and
American Pluralism 213-14 (1997) (suggesting that Sherbert could apply outside
employment context); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G.Sager, The Vulnerability of
Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1245, 1280, 1282 (1994) (same).
65. Smith also distinguishes its holding from a handful of prior decisions presenting a
"hybrid" of free exercise and other constitutional claims. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82. The
majority leaves rather mysterious the mechanics of combining free exercise with other
claims in the future. Does the hybrid claim succeed only where the nonreligious claim
would be strong enough to succeed on its own? If so, why bother to describe the claim as
hybrid at all? See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 566-67 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter
suggests that the entire hybrid exception is unworkable, since the only alternative he sees
to the useless independently sufficient approach is one in which the mere presence of
another claim is sufficient to bypass Smith. See id. at 567. In that case, there would be
nothing left of Smith to bypass. There could also be a mathematical approach, where each
fragment of a constitutional claim possesses a certain weight, and, when merged together,
they add up to something great enough to prevail. Smith, however, is adamant that courts
should not be in the business of assessing the strength of religious burdens. See Smith, 494
U.S. at 886-87. Little wonder, then, that the courts of appeals are split on the question of
how to interpret the hybrid exception. Compare Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights
Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692, 705 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that plaintiff invoking hybrid
exception need only make "colorable claim that a companion right has been infringed"),
vacated on other grounds, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), and Soc'y of
Separationists, Inc. v. Herman, 939 F.2d 1207, 1216-17 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying pre-Smith
precedent for juror's oath case based on theory that it was religion plus speech), with
Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that party
must have independently sufficient claim to invoke hybrid exception), and Kissinger v. Bd.
of Trs. of Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993) (refusing to apply hybrid
exception generally). Two other circuits have commented on the controversy without
taking a definitive position. See Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694,
700 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting hybrid exception requires at least a colorable claim of
another right but might require more); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 467
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (suggesting independently sufficient claim, in combination with free
exercise claim, created an alternative ground for decision). Even if a court could agree on
a workable standard for applying the hybrid exception, it would still have to guess as to the
appropriate level of scrutiny that should accompany non-Smith claims. See Lipson, supra
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C. The Likely Standard of Review
To sum up, it appears that the fairly sweeping language of Smith will
foreclose strict scrutiny of for-cause challenges of religiously motivated
jurors unless those challenges can be shown to be either aimed at belief
rather than conduct, or are part of a system of individual exemptions. As
this Part has demonstrated, we can only describe mental activity as either
belief or conduct after a thorough evaluation of public policy-an evaluation whose contours are themselves well described by the strict scrutiny
process. 66 Since "Witherspoon excludable" jurors are challenged based on
their willingness to use a given mental process, the policy of for-cause
exclusion must be examined under strict scrutiny.67 There is also a plausible argument that the Sherbert exception to Smith should apply, at least
as that exception has been construed by the only court of appeals to have
68
done so to date.
note 35, at 645; William L. Esser IV, Note, Religious Hybrids in the Lower Courts: Free
Exercise Plus or Constitutional Smoke Screen?, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 211, 214 (1998). In
view of these difficulties, there seems not much to be gained, for purposes of this Note, in
speculating how for-cause exclusion might fit into such a ragged framework.
66. A court might engage in essentially the same policy inquiry, while avoiding what
has been called the "rhetorical overkill" of the compelling interest/least restrictive means
test, McConnell, supra note 28, at 1128, by finding that "[e]ffects on religious practice
must be minimized, and can be justified only on the basis of a demonstrable and
unavoidable relation to public purposes unrelated to the effects on religion." Michael W.
McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom,
56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 14 (1989).
67. The interests of the juror are heightened by the significance of the jury
deliberation process. See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991) ("[W]ith the
exception of voting, for most citizens the honor and privilege of jury duty is their most
significant opportunity to participate in the democratic process."). Some might say that
there is not much harm to ajuror who is refused a seat on a particular jury, when another
seat is readily available. Cf. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176 (1986) (noting that
excluded jurors can still serve in other criminal cases). But there may still be harms to
jurors who resent being denied an opportunity to participate in a decision that is of
particular importance to them. Cf.J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 153 (1994)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The injury is to personal dignity and to the individual's right
to participate in the political process."). Nor is it clear why the opportunity to serve on
another criminal jury matters if capital cases are the relevant universe of lost opportunity
for rejected jurors. The Lockhart rationale leaves intact a system in which there are two
castes ofjurors: those who can invoke religion in capital cases and those who cannot. Cf.
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1413, 1497-99
(1989) (condemning legal schemes whose effect is to reserve important rights for selected
privileged groups). Both the dignitary harm and unconstitutional condition theories
suggest that a juror categorically excluded from using fundamental religious beliefs in a
prominent and controversial debate-e.g., the dispute over capital punishment in this
country-may well lose his "'confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system."'
Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 174-75 (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1977)).
68. These conclusions are based only on this Note's analysis of federal free exercise
claims. Several states have rejected the logic of Smith in interpreting their own
constitutions. Of these, the majority apply strict scrutiny even for incidental burdens on
religious activity. See Ala. Const. of 1901 amend. 622, § V (1999); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 52-571b (West Supp. 2000); 775 I1. Comp. Stat. Ann. 35/10 (West 1999); R.I. Gen. Laws

2001]

FREE EXERCISE RIGHTS OF CAPITAL JURORS
III.

THE INTERESTS OF THE STATE

In most of its constitutional analysis, the Supreme Court has found
that strict scrutiny requires the state to show that "its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to
achieve that end."' 69 The jury selection cases present at least three possible governmental interests that might justify the free exercise infringement here. This Part considers these interests in turn. The first section
addresses the need for an "impartial"jury. The section argues that impartiality in the capital sentencing context is different from nearly every
other criminal jury decision in that the sentencing verdict rests not on
facts but rather on a balance of moral factors. Traditional arguments for
70
impartiality, therefore, are far weaker in the death penalty context.
The second section considers the importance of voir dire in ensuring that
jurors uphold the law. It argues first that the texts of most death penalty
statutes, while hostile to absolute precommitments to one verdict or another, permit the use of religious views on the appropriateness of capital
punishment in the weighing process. Alternately, this section goes on to
suggest, where there is ambiguity as to whether a statute permits such
usage or not, we ought to consult the traditional moral justifications for
juries generally to determine whether jurors should have that power. It
concludes, tentatively, that they should.
A. The Right to an ImpartialJury
The Bill of Rights guarantees every criminal defendant the right to
trial by an "impartial jury." 71 Certainly, the protection of constitutional
rights can constitute a compelling state interest. 72 Indeed, the Wither§ 42-80.1 to .3 (1998); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-32-10 to -60 (Law. Co-op. 1999); Matter of
Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819, 822 (Fla. 1993); Rupert v. City of Portland, 605 A.2d 63, 65-66
(Me. 1992); Attorney General v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 235-38 (Mass. 1994); Soc'y of
Jesus v. Boston Landmarks Comm'n, 564 N.E.2d 571, 572-73 (Mass. 1990); McCready v.
Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723, 729 (Mich. 1998); State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 397-99
(Minn. 1990); First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 185-88
(Wash. 1992); State v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235, 238-41 (Wis. 1996). Alaska requires a
compelling government interest to sustain laws with incidental burdens on religious
.19-20, 874
practices. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 1994 AK 4081,
P.2d 274, 280-82 (Alaska 1994). Two other states are less exacting, but still conduct some
balancing between competing religious and state interests. See Abram v. City of
Fayetteville, 661 S.W.2d 371, 372-73 (Ark. 1983) (permitting "reasonable limitation[s]
upon the time, place, and manner" of religious activity); State v. Van Winkle, 889 P.2d 749,
754 (Kan. 1995) (requiring conditions of probation restricting religious freedoms
protected under state constitution to bear "reasonable relationship" to goals of probation).
69. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981).
70. This also means, of course, that the arguments in this Part would be of limited
significance outside of capital sentencing.
71. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
72. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
837-46 (1995) (considering whether potential Establishment Clause violation justified
viewpoint discrimination by state university).
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spoon cases repeatedly note that "[t] he State may insist... thatjurors will
consider and decide the facts impartially. 7 3 That fact alone, however,
does not imply anything about whether excluding certain jurors actually
serves the interest of achieving impartiality. What, after all, is "impartiality"? Although Wainwright declared, somewhat conclusorily, that a standard permitting exclusion of jurors whose views would "substantially impair the performance of [their] duties"'74 serves the interest of
impartiality, the truth of this claim would seem to depend on just what we
mean by impartial, impairment, and duty.
At a minimum, the state's definition of impartiality must be coherent. If the meaning of partiality itself cannot be fixed, then there is no
legitimate basis for claiming that the exclusion of any particular juror
advances the state any closer to the goal of an impartial jury: The goal is
always receding or advancing tautologically, to whatever point the state
can reach by a particular exclusion it desires. While the state may simply
be deluded about the actual coherence of the ideal of impartiality, it
would seem more likely in that circumstance that the desire to exclude a
juror arises from something else (prosecutorial zeal, perhaps) and impartiality is only a pretext.
Modern cognitive theory places the coherence of a theory of jury
impartiality in serious doubt. As one commentator has observed, the
Founders' notion of impartiality was dependant on an Enlightenment-era
notion that the world offered an objectively determinable truth that was
75
A prime exaccessible by careful and thoughtful human observations.
ample of this view is John Marshall's description of an acceptable, unbiased juror, spoken in his role as presiding judge at the infamous treason
trial of Aaron Burr in 1807. Marshall repeatedly used the metaphor of
"impressions" on the minds of prospective jurors-often capturing the
physical flavor of the metaphor's root in wax seals and printing presses:
"It is too general a question to ask, whether [the juror] has any impressions about Colonel Burr. The impressions may be so light that they do
not amount to an opinion of guilt, nor do they go to the extent of believing that the prisoner deserves capital punishment."76 The outside world
was a hard, definable thing to Marshall, like a piece of lead type, that
might stamp rightly or wrongly upon the parchment of a given mind, but
was always unchanged in itself.
Since Marshall's day we have come to think of his view of the world
as "naive."7 7 The modern view is that our understanding of even "objective" data about the physical universe will depend significantly on our
73. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 420 (1985) (citing Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38,
45 (1980)).
74. Id. at 424.
75. See Mark Cammack, In Search of the Post-Positivist Jury, 70 Ind. L.J. 405, 410-14

(1995).
76. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 77 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,693).
77. Cammack, supra note 75, at 409.
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perspective or mental state when receiving such data. 78 As Stanley Fish
puts it, "Perception is never innocent of assumptions, and the assumptions within which it occurs will be responsible for . . . what is perceived. '79 Our background, our culture, even our emotional state, influence our reception of the world so profoundly that it may be difficult for
two people to agree that they are perceiving the same world. 80
Under this view it might be difficult for the state to articulate its view
of "impartiality" with enough specificity to avoid incoherence. In the
strong form of the incoherence claim, there simply is no objective reality
for ajuror to be impartial in regard to. For most of us, though, this claim
is just a bit too much. We believe that there is a world out there, albeit
one about which it is sometimes difficult for us to communicate with each
other. Still, even in its weak form, the incoherence problem is a significant barrier to the state's asserted interest in impartiality. If every jury is
fundamentally biased in ways that are not easily understood, then it is
hard to claim that excluding some jurors who profess a certain view is
really much of an improvement in genuine impartiality. 8 1
Nonetheless, the state might say, there are certainly some kinds of
opinions that are definitely partial, in that they make it likely the juror
will decide contrary to the facts as she herself understands them. For
example, personal enemies of the defendant or those who stand to gain
from her imprisonment are likely to return a dishonest ballot. In most
criminal trials, then, where the jury's decision is dictated by findings on
discrete questions of fact, 82 the state's interest in excluding biased jurors
seems clear. Impartiality is defined coherently in these cases, as truthful
rendering of objective facts about the world. The state's capacity to identify jurors who are unlikely to meet this standard seems high.
78. See Hilary Putnam, How To Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist
(At the Same Time), in Language, Logic, and Philosophy 100, 105-08 (Rudolf Hailer &
Wolfgang Grassl eds., 1980) (describing the view, first propounded by Berkeley and Kant,
that our experience of any object is not of the object itself but rather of the object's "effect
on us").
79. Stanley Fish, Why No One's Afraid of Wolfgang Iser, in Doing What Comes
Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies 68,
78 (1989).
80. For philosophical elaboration on the problems of seeing the world and describing
it, see Saul A. Kripke, Wittgenstein On Rules and Private Language 54-57, 85-86 (1982);
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 151-57, 197-216, 226-27 (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., 2d ed. 1958).
81. Recent social science descriptions of jury decisionmaking have observed that
verdict outcomes are highly contingent on the initial attitudes of the jurors, the time and
manner in which jurors receive additional information, and, in one model, the "narrative
structure" jurors "impose[ ]" on the evidence. See Reid Hastie, Introduction to Inside the
Juror: The Psychology ofJuror Decision Making 3, 12-15, 18, 20, 24-26 (Reid Hastie ed.,
1993)
82. See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 155.42 (McKinney 1998) ("A person is guilty of grand
larceny in the first degree when he steals property and when the value of the property
exceeds one million dollars.").
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Even so, the state's interest remains unclear where the jury's decision
is not dependent upon purely factual determinations.8 3 The jury's death
penalty decision is such a circumstance, in that the jurors' verdicts turn
not on the existence of facts in the world but rather on the jurors' attitudes towards them. Under most of the capital punishment schemes in
which juries may determine or recommend a sentence, the jury must find
84
at least one statutory aggravating factor in order to recommend death.
In most instances these factors consist only of empirical facts-for example, whether the murder was "committed by a person [already] imprisoned as a result of a felony conviction."8 5 These factual findings, though,
83. Cf. Riley v. State, 889 S.W.2d 290, 301 n.4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc)
(arguing that under a fact-based inquiry, opposition to the death penalty would not
prevent a juror from fulfilling her duty, but admitting that it is "arguable" that under the
state's new weighing scheme, objectors could properly execute the law).
84. In some states, this determination is part of the sentencing hearing. See Ark.
Code Ann. § 5-4-603(a) (Michie 1997); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-46a(f), (i) (West Supp.
2000); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(d) (1995); Ind. Code Ann. § 35-50-2-9(a) (Michie
1998); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4624(e) (1995); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 905.3 (West
1997); Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 413(f) (1996); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(3) (2000);
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 565.030(4) (West 1999); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. 200.030(4)(a) (Michie
1997); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 630:5(W) (1996); NJ. Stat. Ann. § 2C:]1-3(c)(3)(a) (West
1995); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 400.27(11)(a) (McKinney 2000); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A2000(c) (1999); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 701.11 (West 1997); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 9711(c) (1) (iv) (West 1998); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(C) (Law. Co-op. 1996); S.D.
Codified Laws § 23A-27A-4 (Michie 1998); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i) (1997); Wyo.
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-102(e) (Lexis 1999).
Several other states achieve the same result by making the aggravating factors
elements of the offense to be charged and proved beyond reasonable doubt at trial. See
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.03(C) (2) (a), (D)(2) (West 1994); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202
(1999); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.95.020 (West Supp. 2001).
85. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-604(1) (Michie 1997).
Some states allow the jury to find aggravation based on the somewhat more moral
than factual question of whether the murder was especially cruel, heinous, inhuman, or
the like. The Supreme Court has found, though, that these statutes are unconstitutionally
vague under the Eighth Amendment unless further defined by state court decisions and/
or the trial judge's instructions. See Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 1, 2 (1990) (Marshall,J.,
concurring); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 364-65 (1988). Many states now limit
their "especially cruel" aggravator to specific factual situations, such as where the
defendant has tortured the victim or mutilated his corpse. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 630:5(VII)(h) (1996); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:11-3(C)(4)(c) (West 1995); S.D. Codified
Laws § 23A-27A-1(6) (Michie 1998); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(5) (1997); Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(q) (1999); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-102(h) (vii) (Lexis 1999); State v.
Breton, 562 A.2d 1060, 1066-67 (Conn. 1989); State v. Hamilton, 681 So. 2d 1217,
1226-27 (La. 1996) (reciting facts sufficient to meet Maynard standard); State v. Bonney,
405 S.E.2d 145, 155-56 (N.C. 1991) (same); State v. Martin, 278 S.E.2d 214, 220 (N.C.
1981) (same); Eddings v. State, 616 P.2d 1159, 1167-68 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980) (same),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
Other states continue to employ a broad heinousness aggravator. See Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 921.141 (5) (h) (West 1996); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4625(6) (1995); La. Code Crim. Proc.
Ann. art. 905.4(A)(7) (West 1997); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(5)(h) (2000); Mo. Ann.
Stat. §565.032(2)(7) (West 1999). Delaware's broad provision has been held
unconstitutionally vague by its supreme court but has not yet been remedied. See Del.
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are only the first step in a complex balancing to be undertaken by the
sentencing juror. The jury must also determine that death is appropriate
in light of possible mitigating factors. 86 In many cases, it must explicitly
find that the permissible aggravating factors present outweigh the mitigating factors before recommending death.8 7 Some juries can also engage in an additional consideration of whether or not to reject death
regardless of the balancing-out of mercy, for instance.8 8 Consequently,
assuming that jurors follow the prescribed process,8 9 it cannot be said
that any determination is biased in the sense that it is dishonest about the
facts of the case.
An additional problem for the state is that, for the most part, there is
no way to know in advance how individual jurors will interpret and weigh
the facts presented to them at sentencing. Thus, any given juror may be
just as likely to harbor a predisposition towards one outcome-based on
his reaction to the evidence and the judge's words-as the juror who has
religious opinions about a death verdict.9 0 The state may be right to
claim that jurors who state that they would "automatically" vote for or
Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1) (1995); Bailey v. State, 503 A.2d 1210, 1212 (Del. 1984).
Virginia's "depravity of mind" aggravator has, if anything, been broadened by state
supreme court decisions, such that it now embraces victim impact testimony. See Va. Code
Ann. § 19.2-264.4(C) (Michie 2000); Weeks v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 379, 389-90
(Va. 1994) (admitting victim testimony as probative of the "depravity of mind component
of the vileness predicate"). The validity of a conviction relying on one of these statutory
aggravators is open to question given the holdings of Shell and Maynard. Statutory
aggravators remain, then, primarily factual.
86. See McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 442 (1990); Eddings, 455 U.S. at
110-12; Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280, 303-05 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
87. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-603(a) (Michie 1997); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a46a(f) (West Supp. 2000); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(c)(3)(a) (1995); Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 921.141(2) (West 1990);. Ind. Code Ann. § 35-50-2-9(k) (Michie 1998); Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 21-4624(e) (1995); Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 413(h) (1996); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19101 (3) (2000); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 565.030(4) (West 1999); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 175.554(3)
(Michie 1997); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:11-3(C)(3)(a)-(c) (West 1995); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law
§ 400.27(11)(a) (McKinney 1999) ("substantially outweigh"); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A2000(c) (1999); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.03(D) (2) (West 1997); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit.
21, § 701.11 (West 1997); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9711(c) (1) (iv) (West 1998); Tenn.
Code Ann. § 39- 1 3-204(g)(1) (1997); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(4)(b) (1999).
88. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-603(b)(3) (Michie 1997); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 565.030(4)
(West 1999); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(4) (b) (1999); Scott v. State, 529 A.2d 340, 345-46
(Md. 1987).
89. See infra Part III.B.1.
90. See WilliamJ. Bowers et al., Foreclosed Impartiality in Capital Sentencing: Jurors'
Predispositions, Guilt-Trial Experience, and Premature Decision Making, 83 Cornell L.
Rev. 1476 (1998). The authors, describing their empirical study of capital jury
decisionmaking, report that many jurors made their determination based on "personal
reasons or influences, including particular forms or kinds of evidence, aspects or
characteristics of the defendant, the conduct of the prosecution or defense attorneys, and
the like." Id. at 1496. In addition, sometimes "the defendant's demeanor throughout the
guilt trial shaped the juror's impression of his character." Id. The authors conclude,
"These accounts suggest that jurors reach a premature decision on punishment both
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against the death penalty are predictably biased. 91 Yet impartiality is still
defined incoherently for every other member of the venire (i.e., the pool
of potential jurors). As a result, it will still be difficult for the state to
show that by excluding the "automatic" jurors it has made any gains toward an impartial jury.
Even so, might we not say that there are clearly some jurors who are
more impartial than others? If so, won't exclusion of the least impartial
jurors serve the state's purpose?9 2 While this observation has some force
as applied to jurors who would certainly and "automatically" vote for or
against a death verdict, it holds less water for any otherjuror. As the law
has long recognized, jurors are rarely fully aware of the extent of their
own biases. 93 They may also have a limited capacity to communicate
their views to the judge. Most significantly, all death penalty jurors are at
sentencing prone, to an unknown extent, to the subjectivity biases described supra. 94 In short, every juror is potentially "substantially impaired"-at least as to the mostly moral capital sentencing decision-to
an extent equal to or greater than the excluded partial objector. In view
of these uncertainties, it seems a stretch to describe as "compelling" an
interest that can rarely, if ever, be definitively advanced.
The state might also reply that the ad hoc, tautological nature of
impartiality is, in fact, no barrier to achieving its objective. After all, the
state defines the factors that jurors are to consider. Why shouldn't the
state also get to define what constitutes bias? One problem with this approach is that, given the great multiplicity of viewpoints in our society,
the government's identification of some as "impartial" and some as "biased" unfairly privileges the "impartial" views and "delegitimizes the
claims of those asserting that their voices are missing from the judicial
process." 95 In Smith, though, Justice Scalia dismisses the burdens on
delegitimized groups as an "unavoidable consequence of democratic
96
government."
because of their predispositions or attitudes and because of their experiences during the
guilt trial." Id. at 1502.
91. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992).
92. See, e.g., id. at 734 n.7 (holding that although all veniremen are potentially
biased, the purpose of voir dire is to eliminate those at either extreme).
93. See, e.g., United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 78 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,693)
(statement of Mr. Wickham) ("[W]hen we object to a juryman [is it] ... for his want of
honesty? No, sir, every man is subject to partialities and aversions, which may
unconsciously sway his judgment. Mr. Upshaw does no doubt deem himself an impartial
juryman; but Mr. Upshaw may be deceived.").
94. Cf. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 444 (1985) (Brennan,J., dissenting) ("When
the time for decision arrives such [allegedly unbiased] jurors might or might not turn out
to be so affected by the prospect of a death sentence in the case before them that they
render a biased judgment; typically neither eventuality can be divined at the voir dire
stage.").
95. Cammack, supra note 75, at 456.
96. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
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In any event, at bottom this claim is not based on the partiality of the
juror per se, so much as the fact that the excluded juror is likely to transgress the law's standard of impartiality. Thus, we turn now to the state's
interest in upholding the law.
B. Upholding the Law
The Witherspoon cases frequently advert to the state's interest in ensuring that jurors will "follow the law" 97 or "conscientiously apply the law
as charged by the court."98 The cases are also generally in agreement
that a juror who states categorically or gives substantial reason for suspecting that she will always return a verdict for or against death is "announcing an intention not to follow the instructions [of the judge].'99
Thus, eliminating jurors who make such declarations for religious reasons would likely satisfy a compelling state interest. 100 The next subsection, therefore, examines whether the letter of various capital sentencing
laws is consistent with the use of preexisting juror preferences. It appears
that in an overwhelming majority of states, there is a very strong textual
argument that jurors can appropriately and legally apply their religious
opinions to the work of "weighing" or "balancing" the required sentencing factors.' 0 1 In a handful of states-some important, because of the
frequency with which their jurors return death verdicts-the law is simply
ambiguous. Drawing on the work of Professor Ronald Dworkin, the second subsection argues that we might resolve our uncertainty in these
states by observing that individualized moral decisionmaking by jurors at
sentencing "fits" the traditions of our legal system and, therefore, should
be presumptively legal. The result is that there is no illegal behavior for
the state to target in seeking to "uphold the law."
1. The Letter of the Laws. - Do state and federal death penalty statutes actually have the effect of prohibiting to jurors recourse to their faith
at sentencing? The answer to this question is complicated by the fact that
modern capital juries at sentencing have an unusual double role. Under
most schemes, the jury must first find whether or not there exists one or
more statutorily defined "aggravating factors"' 0 2 or "special circum97. Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 421.
98. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980).
99. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 738 (1992).
100. Although not specifically familiar with any religion that would cause its
adherents always to vote in favor of death, we might guess that a literal interpreter of the
Old Testament might take that position.
101. At least for jurors whose religious beliefs make them reluctant to vote for death.
Jurors whose faith points them in the opposite direction have very weak textual arguments
in most states. See infra note 113.
102. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3593(d) (2000) (directing that jury must find unanimously
that one or more of the statutory or nonstatutory aggravating factors identified before trial
by the government exists in order to impose sentence of death); Ala. Code § 13A-5-45(f)
(1994) (requiring jury to find at least one aggravating factor to exist beyond a reasonable
doubt in order to recommend a sentence of death).
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stances." 10 3 This determination is essentially identical to the typical factual finding conducted at the guilt phase of most trials. The jury is then
usually instructed that they are to "weigh" the seriousness of the aggravating factors against a set of mitigating factors. 10 4 In some states, the jury
must also make findings about whether each mitigating factor has been
established according to a certain level of proof. In many others, though,
each juror is free to consider any factors that occur to him, even those
10 5
not put forward by the defendant.
It would seem, then, that in some states it should be possible to argue, much as Justice Scalia argues in his Morgan dissent, that the wording
of the death penalty statute leaves open a textual argument that even flatout ex ante refusal to find aggravation is consistent with the law. For
103. Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a) (West 1999) (permitting death penalty only on
finding of one or more of 21 statutory special circumstances, including "lying in wait" and
use of a destructive device posing great risk of death). For other statutes enumerating
required aggravating factors, see supra note 84.
104. See supra note 87.
105. A number of statutes expressly allow consideration of any mitigating factor. See
18 U.S.C. § 3592(a) (2000) ("In determining whether a sentence of death is to be imposed
on a defendant, the finder of fact shall consider any mitigating factor ... ");Conn. Gen.
Stat. Ann. § 53a-46a(d) (West Supp. 2000); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.025(2) (Michie 1999);
Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 413(h) (2000); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.04(B) (West Supp.
2000); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(C) (Law. Co-op. 1999); S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-27A-1
(Michie 1998); Hall v. Wainwright, 733 F.2d 766, 774 n.1I (11 th Cir. 1984) (Florida statute
allows consideration of any mitigating factor); White v. State, 403 So. 2d 331, 336 (Fla.
1981) (same). Other states note that available mitigating factors include but are not
limited to those listed in the statute. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-605 (Michie 1997); Kan.
Stat. Ann. § 21-4626 (1995); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2000(f) (1999); Va. Code Ann. § 19:2264.4(B) (Michie 2000); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.95.070 (West Supp. 2001). A similar
approach, adopted by a few states, is to imply open-ended mitigation by stating that
mitigating elements "include" the statutory factors. See Mo. Ann. Stat. § 565.032(3) (West
1999); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 630:5(VI) (1996); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 400.27(9)
(McKinney 2001); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9711 (e) (West 2000); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3207(3) (1999); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-102(j) (Lexis 1999).
Yet other laws appear to track the constitutional minimum for mitigating factors set
out in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-08 (1978) ("[S]entencer, in all but the rarest
kind of capital case [must] not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any
aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense
that the defendant proffers . . . .") (citation omitted). See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11,
§ 4209(c)(3)a.2 (1995); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101 (2000); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:113(c) (5)(h) (West 2000); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.071 § 2(0 (4) (Vernon 2000);
Wilcher v. State, 697 So. 2d 1087, 1103-04 (Miss. 1997). A fair construction of Lockett
probably limits its mandate to mitigation stemming from the particular background or
circumstances of the defendant and the crime, rather than general religious sentiments
about capital punishment. Assuming the statutes mean to do no more than they must,
they probably are also limited to individualized factors.
Lastly, a few statutes permit consideration of "any other mitigating circumstances" so
that it is ambiguous whether "circumstances" includes an individual juror's general
religious views on the death penalty. See Ind. Code Ann. § 35-50-2-9(c) (8) (Michie 1998);
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. 200.035(7) (Michie 1997); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(e) (1) (1999)
(declaring that court may, but need not, instruct on nonstatutory aggravating
circumstances).
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example, the Illinois law in question in Morgan defines only one aggravating factor, contract killing. Otherwise, although commanded to "consider all the aggravating factors supported by the evidence and all the
mitigating factors supported by the evidence," the jury is free to conclude
that any given fact is either aggravating or mitigating, or neither. 0 6 A
juror who admits in voir dire that he does not plan to find any facts
(other than contractual killing) to be aggravating does not contravene
the language of the statute.
In most states, however, and under the federal scheme, when ajuror
finds that a factor defined as aggravating exists, she must then consider it
as an aggravating factor to be weighed against the mitigation, if any. A
juror might say, then, that her commitment against the death penalty
does not mean she will refuse to recognize as aggravating the statutory
factors. Instead, she might simply not find them weighty enough to merit
capital punishment. Under this logic, the juror "weighs" a factor at sentencing, even though she believes at voir dire it will rarely be heavy
enough to overcome her qualms about the penalty. Only in the case of a
statute that specifically forbids consideration of the factors that weigh in
the opposite direction for that juror would the juror actually be violating
the language of the law. 107 A somewhat more difficult question would be
presented by a juror in a state like Georgia, in which a judge lists for the
jury permissible mitigating factors, and the juror's own personal reason
for opposing the death penalty categorically is not among them. 10 8 Arguably, the juror is not following the letter of the law if she then counts
her private sentiments as a balancing factor.
The success of this argument might turn on a semantic question
about the meaning of "weigh." Is the act of considering competing factors still "weighing" when it is actually a foregone conclusion, a hollow
gesture? The Court has said not, although one could see a reasonable
argument in the other direction. 10 9 The categorical, or "automatic,"
death penalty opponent, then, is not "weighing." Because she is therefore not following the law, the state has a compelling interest in excluding her.
What, then, of the juror who is only unlikely or reluctant to impose
death? Suppose a venue where the personal qualms of the juror are per106. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 742-43 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). A
similar argument might be available under the Mississippi statute, in which jurors must
find that "sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated." Miss. Code Ann. § 9919-101(3) (b) (2000). An aggravator could be present but simply not "sufficient" in the
juror's mind to merit a recommendation of death.
107. See Morgan, 504 U.S. at 742 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
108. See Ga. Code Ann. § 17-10-30(b) (1997).
109. See Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729; cf. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-15
(1982) (holding that although sentencer may determine the weight given to mitigating
evidence, it may not give zero weight). For the reasonable argument in the other
direction, see Garvey & Coney, supra note 26, at 338-39.
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missible mitigating factors.' 10 In these instances, the juror seems well
within the law as long as she legitimately gives some consideration to the
aggravating factors. Indeed, some commentators have suggested that
statutes of this kind specifically call on jurors to exercise their own personal philosophy, including their religious beliefs.1 I' In these statutory
schemes, the state's interest would be limited to preventing the possibility
that the challenged juror would refuse to recognize a defined aggravating
factor.1 12 Since no rational juror would do that when she could accomplish the same result through a permissible weighing, this will rarely rise
3
to the level of a compelling government interest." 1
110. See supra note 88; see also People v. Malone, 762 P.2d 1249, 1274 (Cal. 1988)
(en banc) (holding verdict against death not unreasonable where based on sympathy for
defendant, even though jury found expressly that the aggravating factors outweighed the

statutory mitigating factors).
111. See Laura S. Underkuffler, Agentic and Conscientic Decisions in Law: Death
and Other Cases, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1713, 1724-25 (1999). Underkuffler's claim
presumes that the community's moral views-to which a capital defendant is entitled-are
duly represented by a sort of sampling, in which each juror follows her own conscience,
rather than attempting to capture the moral sense of the community at large. Id. at
1725-26. Arguably, the Court's approval of jurors who harbor personal biases, but are
willing to set them aside to follow the judge's instructions, see Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510, 514 n.7 (1968), suggests a model in which jurors are expected to apply
community standards of morality, rather than their own, even in statutes that seem to give
wide latitude to juror discretion.
112. The state also has an interest in protecting the proceedings against

contamination by morally wrong or irrelevant factors. In discussing "religious"
motivations, though, this Note assumes that term will not embrace racial supremacism or
other obviously irrelevant factors.
113. However, the textual arguments of pro-death penalty jurors are much weaker,

and the state interest correspondingly stronger. Most states prohibit the use of any
nonstatutory aggravating factors. See Ala. Code § 13A-5-49 (1975); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4604 (Michie 1997); Cal. Penal Code § 190.2 (West 1999); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-46a(h)
(1994); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4625 (1995); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 905.4 (West
1997); Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 413(d), (f)(2000); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101 (2000);
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.032(2) (1999); Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.033 (2000); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 2929.04(A) (West 1997); Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 701.11 (2000); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 9711(d) (West 1998); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(c) (a) (Law. Co-op. 1996); S.D. Codified
Laws § 23A-27A-1 (Michie 1998); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.071 § 2(b) (Vernon
2000); Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(C) (Michie 2000); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-102(h) (Lexis
1999); Vaught v.State, 410 So. 2d 147, 151 (Fla. 1982); Holmes v. State, 671 N.E.2d 841,
848 (Ind. 1996). But see Ga. Code Ann. § 17-10-30(b) (1997); Tamme v. Commonwealth,
759 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Ky. 1988). In a few states jurors may apply nonstatutory aggravating
factors if and only if there is also at least one statutory aggravator present. See Del. Code
Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(c) (3) (1995); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 630:5(IV) (1996); State v. Nichols,
877 S.W.2d 722, 731 (Tenn. 1994); State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285-86 (Utah 1989).

Some schemes further limit juror-created aggravating factors by restricting permissible
aggravators to those identified by the prosecution before trial or before the sentencing
hearing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c) (2000); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 630:5(I) (b) (1996); Okla.
Stat. tit. 21, § 701.10 (2000).
Since statutory aggravators are almost universally factual, see supra note 85 and

accompanying text, ajury that must find at least one statutory aggravator necessarily must
make at least one factual finding before imposing a death sentence. At the time of voir
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In other states, though, the only place ajuror's predisposition could
be reflected is in the relative weightings of permissible factors. There is
no statute that prescribes the absolute value of its factors, and any law
that required a verdict of death upon the mere finding of any factor or
combination of factors would probably be unconstitutional.1 14 Where
each juror likely brings a different view on the relative weight of each
factor, there seems little genuine state interest in excluding some jurors
in what is essentially random fashion. 15 To exclude ajuror, then, simply
because she will allow her religious beliefs to inform the relative weights
of the sentencing factors, probably would violate the First Amendment.
2. Resolving Doubts in the Border States. - What, though, are we to do
in states like Georgia, where at best, one might say, the text of state law
and particularized jury instructions might leave it ambiguous as to
whetherjurors can use their preexisting views of the death penalty at sentencing?' 16 Perhaps the state has an interest in protecting its law even
dire, a judge cannot know whether or not the facts of the case will support a finding of
aggravation to the requisite level of proof, which is often beyond a reasonable doubt.
Thus, a juror who at voir dire is already ready to say that he is likely to impose death is in
effect promising to be dishonest about the facts. Exclusion is appropriate for such jurors.
See supra text accompanying notes 81-83.
A court might also distinguish religious motives against death from those in favor of it
by relying on Justice O'Connor's remark that "limiting the accused's use of the peremptory
is 'a serious misordering of our priorities,' for it means 'we have exalted the right of
citizens to sit on juries over the rights of the criminal defendant, even though it is the
defendant.., who faces ...death." J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 150 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 61-62 (1992)
(Thomas, J., concurring)).
114. For instance, although the Texas statute makes death "automatic" if the jury
gives an affirmative answer to three questions, one of the questions requires jurors to weigh
aggravating and mitigating factors. The Court has said that it is this latter element of
discretion that mfikes the law constitutional. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 272-73 (1976)
(plurality opinion). But see Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 n.11 (1978) (plurality
opinion) ("We express no opinion as to whether the need to deter certain kinds of
homicide would justify a mandatory death sentence ....").
115. According to one empirical study, a large percentage of jurors make up their
mind about sentencing well before the judge's sentencing instructions, and
overwhelmingly these jurors stick to their decisions. See Bowers et al., supra note 90, at
1487-88, 1491-93. Although some of these jurors might simply be reaching the same
decision after applying the judge's instructions, many are probably, in effect, ignoring the
judge. See id. at 1490 ("[M]ost [jurors] boldly affirmed that they were convinced of what
the punishment should be .. .before hearing the judge's sentencing instructions .. ").
Other studies have suggested that capital juries have difficulty understanding the judge's
instructions for the complex sentencing procedure. See Michael B. Blankenship et al.,
Jurors' Comprehension of Sentencing Instructions: A Test of the Death Penalty Process in
Tennessee, 14Just. Q. 325, 325-29 (1997);James Frank & Brandon K. Applegate, Assessing
Juror Understanding of Capital-Sentencing Instructions, 44 Crime & Delinq. 412, 419-23
(1998);James Luginbuhl, Comprehension ofJudges' Instructions in the Penalty Phase of a
Capital Trial, 16 L. & Hum. Behav. 203, 203-07 (1992). Thus, there might not be much
gained in the law-abiding quality of the jury by excluding religiously-motivated jurors.
116. The other states in this category are Delaware, Mississippi, New Jersey, Texas,
and perhaps Indiana, Nevada, and Tennessee. See supra note 105.
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when hazy and uncertain. Yet if there is a strong interpretive tool to resolve close calls, and the tool suggests that a law has not been infringed,
the state's interest is at least considerably weakened, if not undermined
altogether. Applying the text alone, or the words of the judge, is an impoverished view of "law." After all, when words are ambiguous, or they
leave us with further questions before we know for certain what they
mean, we generally do not give up and go home. Instead, we create a list
in our head of all the possible meanings, and then pare that list down as
we reject options that are wildly out of context, or inconsistent with the
conversation we have had up until now. Perhaps "the law" we ask jurors
to follow, which we convey to them in words, is similarly subject to the
tools we use to understand each other in everyday life.
This theory of "the law" is set out by Ronald Dworkin. 117 Dworkin
explains that any system of rules almost inevitably presents hard casesareas where the text of the existing law does not definitively resolve the
question. The legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart describes a similar phenomenon, which he terms a "gap" in the law.1 18 Depending on one's view of
the clarity of language, some or even all cases may actually turn out to be
all gap and no rule. Since the law can provide no clear guidance to the
decisionmaker, Hart says, it is appropriate for the decisionmaker to make
a pure policy decision, based upon whatever criteria move her. 119
Dworkin, however, rejects this contention, insisting that interpretations are necessarily bound and constrained at least by the principles underlying the texts upon which they draw.1 20 When the law has a gap, a
person who is trying to follow the law will formulate some theory of legal
interpretation and apply it to the text of the law in order to extrapolate
the likely principle that governs the fuzzy area.' 2' The key distinction
between this approach and Hart's is that, in Dworkin's view, his method is
not a replacement for law; it is law. The process is the same for easy and
1 22
hard cases, but it is only noticeable in the hardest ones.
Lastly, it is very important to realize that the interpreter's results cannot be entirely result-driven. She is not writing new law; she is choosing
among the possible, probably limited set of meanings for an existing law.
That is why easy cases are "easy"; there is only one interpretation that is
logically consistent with what has come before. Dworkin describes this
idea as "fit." He says:
Judges... may not read the abstract moral clauses as expressing
any particular moral judgment... unless they find it consistent
in principle with the structural design of the Constitution as a
whole, and also with the dominant lines of past constitutional
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 87-88 (1986).
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of the Law 123, 147-54 (2d ed. 1994).
Id. at 251-54.
See Dworkin, supra note 117, at 176-275.
Id. at 87.
See id. at 353-54.
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interpretation by other judges. They must regard themselves as
partners with other officials, past and future, who together elabtake
orate a coherent constitutional morality, and they must
123
care to see that what they contribute fits with the rest.
The significant point to note here is that later interpretations must be
consistent not only on the surface-at the level of a bare holding-but
also at a deep principled level. Once we can say, though, that the decision matches both the outcomes and principles of preceding authorities,
24
then we are securely within "the law" whatever our conclusion.1
Is there an argument, then, that jurors can follow the underlying
principles of the American jury-and hence the law-when employing a
moral authority that might arguably be denied to them by a surface reading of a state statute and judge's instructions? This tension between
community rulemaking in the abstract, and juror moral decisionmaking
in the particular, has been played out in the debate over 'jury nullification." Nullification generally refers to the act of a jury in acquitting a
defendant despite the fact that the letter of the law appears to require a
conviction. 125 Proponents of nullification have long argued that the
power of the jury to refuse to convict presents an important check against
tyrannical or overzealous government. 126 Jurors protected William Penn
from hanging; they seriously undermined the force of Britain's seditious
libel laws in the colonies; and they madeJohn Hancock's smuggling business a continuing success, despite his numerous arrests. 12 7 Obviously,
though, these triumphant examples were against genuinely tyrannical regimes. It seems to be an open question whether such a vigorous defense
of liberty is needed within a representative democratic system, though
one scholar has suggested that the American tradition of nullification
shows that we believe jurors ought to make political, as well as factual,
128
decisions.
The values cited by defenders of jury nullification continue to be
relied upon by courts in defending the institution of the jury generally.
For example, in Taylor v. Louisiana,129 the Supreme Court overturned the
123. Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American
Constitution 10 (1996).
124. See Dworkin, supra note 117, at 410-13.
125. See Alan Scheflin & Jon Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a
Controversy, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1980, at 51, 56; see generally Jeffrey
Abramson, We, the Jury: The Jury System and the Ideal of Democracy 57-95 (1994)
(describing features of jury nullification). The argument for nullification, then, is

necessarily a worst-case scenario for our jurors, most of whom will face only ambiguity as to
whether the law forecloses their decisional process.
126. See, e.g., William M. Kunstler, Jury Nullification in Conscience Cases, 10 Va. J.
Int'l L. 71, 71 (1969);Jack B. Weinstein, ConsideringJury "Nullification": When May and
Should aJury Reject the Law to DoJustice, 30 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 239, 240-41, 244 (1993).
127. See Steven M. Warshawsky, Note, OpposingJury Nullification: Law, Policy, and
Prosecutorial Strategy, 85 Geo. L.J. 191, 196-202 & n.58 (1996).
128. See Abramson, supra note 125, at 61.
129. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
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conviction of a man who had been convicted by ajury drawn from a pool
in which women had to file a special application in order to be eligible
for service. The Court announced that the Sixth Amendment required
juries to be drawn from a "representative cross-section" of the community, since "[t]he purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of
arbitrary power-to make available the commonsense judgment of the
community as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor
and in preference to the professional or perhaps overconditioned or biased response of a judge.' 30 Rule-of-law considerations, along with
problems of practical application, have limited the high ideals of Taylor.
Recognizing that no random draw of a hundred or so people will necessarily sample all the significant viewpoints within a community, the Court
has concluded that the cross-section requirement imposes strictures only
13 1
on the venire rather than the jury actually selected.
Nullification has also been the driving factor in the area of "special
verdicts" or 'juror interrogatories." Under federal law, in most circuits, a
district court should ask a jury only whether the defendant is guilty or
innocent of each count; it should not ask them to respond to a series of
factual or legal questions, each individually insufficient for guilt but cumulatively equivalent to it. The traditional rationale for this policy has
been that interrogatories pose a danger that the jury will be led " [b]y a
progression of questions each of which seems to require an answer unfavorable to the defendant," to reach a verdict of guilty, when it might otherwise have-perhaps in defiance of logic-acquitted.132 Recent developments in criminal law, though, have placed increasing pressure on the
rule against special verdicts. In complex drug conspiracy and racketeering cases, a court will often want to avoid having a retrial on every count
in the event the defendant successfully appeals. One way to do that is to
ask the jury to make specific findings as to the involvement of each defendant in each predicate act. If, for example, evidence of one of the underlying predicate acts is then ordered excluded by an appellate court, the
verdict can still be shown to rest, undisturbed, on other predicates. Indeed, some circuits now recognize this situation as an exception to their
rule against special verdicts. 133 Similarly, with the rise of sentencing
130. Id. at 528-30.
131. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173-74 (1986).
132. United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 182 (1st Cir. 1969); accord United States v.
Adcock, 447 F.2d 1337, 1339 (2d Cir. 1971) (per curiam). But see United States v.
Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 926-27 (2d Cir. 1984) (Newman, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (weighing Spock considerations along with similar policy concerns in
concluding that "a District Court should have the discretion to use a jury interrogatory in
cases where risk of prejudice to the defendant is slight and the advantage of securing
particularized fact-finding is substantial").
133. See United States v. Ogando, 968 F.2d 146, 148-49 (2d Cir. 1992); United States
v. Aiello, 900 F.2d 528, 534 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Roman, 870 F.2d 65, 73 (2d Cir.
1989); Ruggiero, 726 F.2d at 922-23; United States v. Desmond, 670 F.2d 414, 418 (3d Cir.
1982); see also Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 737 (1952) (holding interrogatory
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schemes, like the federal drug laws, that place heavy emphasis on the
facts of the case, a court will often be tempted to submit individual questions of fact-like the total weight of drugs-to a jury. 3 4 These exceptions are so common to federal trials that the Ninth Circuit has now said
13 5
that it is, essentially, abandoning the rule against special verdicts.
Other courts have not followed suit, however.
One area ofjurisprudence that does seem unambiguously to support
the principle of nullification is the law of double jeopardy. Double jeopardy is not symmetrical; a defendant can obtain a new trial when the evidence against him is dubious, but the government cannot similarly retry a
questionable acquittal. 13 6 The inconsistency of the rules excludes judicial
economy as a likely explanation for the heightened protection for the
defendant. Similarly, if reducing the wear and tear or oppression of the
defendant is the driving factor, why allow retrials after a hungjury? This
leaves protection of the jury's right to acquit-on whatever basis it
13 7
chooses-as the most plausible explanation.
On the other hand, courts have often refused to instruct juries on
their supposed "power" to nullify. The leading case is Sparf v. United
States. 13 8 In upholding a trial court's instruction to the jury that they
could not return a verdict of manslaughter, and over a vigorous pro-nullification dissent from Justice Gray, the firstJustice Harlan emphasized that
the function ofjudge as giver of law was essential to protecting "the stability of public justice, as well as the security of private and personal
appropriate to ensure jury has complied with defendants' constitutional right to finding of
overt act in treason charge); United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(explaining Kawakita as requiring exception to interrogatory rule for constitutionally
required findings of overt acts); Spock, 416 F.2d at 182 n.41 (noting Kawakita exception).
134. See United States v. Pforzheimer, 826 F.2d 200, 205-06 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing
United States v. Orozco-Prada, 732 F.2d 1076, 1084 (2d Cir. 1984)); Ruggiero, 726 F.2d at
926 (Newman, J., concurring); United States v. Murray, 618 F.2d 892, 895 n.3 (2d Cir.
1980); see also United States v. Melvin, 27 F.3d 710, 716 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding
interrogatories permissible where necessary to determine whether to sentence defendants
for possessing automatic weapons or firearms generally); North, 910 F.2d at 911 (noting
interrogatories permissible with defendant's consent to determine fair sentence); Desmond,
670 F.2d at 418 (holding interrogatories necessary when certain facts crucial in
determining appropriate sentence); Spock, 416 F.2d at 182 n.41 (same). For example, in
Orozco-Prada, the defendants, a set of money launderers, were convicted on a count of
conspiring to distribute controlled substances. Orozco-Prada, 732 F.2d at 1078-79. The
same count included, as its underlying substantive claim, allegations that the defendants
had aided in the distribution of both marijuana and cocaine. Since the resultant
sentencing ranges were greatly divergent, depending on whether or not the conspiracy
involved cocaine, the panel found that the best course would be to remand, with the
district court to employ a special interrogatory to guide its sentencing. Id. at 1084.
135. United States v. Reed, 147 F.3d 1178, 1181 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding use of
special verdict should be a matter of district court discretion in each case).
136. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S.
662, 671 (1896).
137. See Scott, 437 U.S. at 91 (holdingjury's right of acquittal is final regardless of its
basis).
138. 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
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rights."'1 39 If every juror were free to follow his own theory of "the law,"
or her own personal moral system, there would be an intolerable unpredictability and inconsistency in the application of the law. 140 This, of
course, was the exact reason that the Supreme Court struck down Geor14 1
gia's death penalty statute in Furman.
We might conclude, then, that on balance the overall thrust of the
law seems to be away from jury decisions that look like nullification, at
least when it comes to general verdicts. This does leave open the question: Unpredictability and inconsistency are frequently invoked
bogeymen, but what makes them so bad in the context of sentencing? Put
another way, might the moral principles underlying the ban on "cruel
and unusual" punishments, if added to our general analysis of the need
42
for consistency in the criminal law, produce a different outcome?1
One likely principle is deterrence. In that scenario, a "cruel" punishment is one that overdeters. An "unusual" penalty might also fail as deterrent because potential criminals are not familiar enough with its sting
to weigh its seriousness against the benefit of their designs. Unpredictable sentences, such as might result from jurors nullifying at the penalty
phase, are at least "unusual" under this theory. 1 4 3 But, in light of the
predictability and seriousness of the inevitable life sentence in the event
death is not imposed, it is hard to believe nullification at sentencingreally
1 44
could undermine the deterrent effect of murder sanctions.
We could tell a similar story with a retributive theory of punishment. 145 Irregular sentences undermine the public's sense that a sentence was justly matched to the defendant's culpability. In addition, they
render a just correspondence between sentence and crime pure chance.
This, although it lies beneath the surface of the various opinions, is the
likely rationale of Furman and ensuing cases. When a defendant is sentenced to death for morally objectionable reasons, such as racism, or even
for no reason at all-as in Justice Stewart's famous "struck by lightning"
analogy 4 6 -it represents a failure of the law to guarantee ajust pairing of
punishment with culpability. The Furmansolution, though, is not to foreclose all jury moral decisionmaking, but rather to balance the jury's
power against the potential for misguided discretion. We have already
139. Id. at 106.
140. See id. at 74; United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1134-37 (D.C. Cir.

1972).
141. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
142. Id. (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VIII).
143. This Note leaves aside the question whether the death penalty overdeters in
general, and so is "cruel" in this scheme.
144. Except, perhaps, in the case of defendants who are already serving a life
sentence.
145. For an argument that the Eighth Amendment requires sentencing based on
retributivist principles, see Scott W. Howe, Resolving the Conflict in Capital Sentencing
Cases: A Desert-Oriented Theory of Regulation, 26 Ga. L. Rev. 323, 387-94 (1992).
146. Furman, 408 U.S. at 309 (concurring opinion).
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seen the outcome of that balance for our purposes: The state is not good
enough at identifying ex ante jurors who are likely to apply "improper"
moral judgment under the cloth of religious reasoning to justify the re14 7
sulting burden on free exercise.
If Professor Dworkin is right, then, it may not make sense to say that
a death penalty juror is not "apply[ing] the law" simply because she ascribes her own weight to the statutory factors.1 48 Law, in his view, is made
by the subjective reading of the interpreter, constrained by "fit." Where
the letter of the law does not foreclose a juror's use of preexisting religious views about the death penalty, and the American tradition appears to
embrace it, perhaps the state can no longer claim that the juror has de149
fied the law.
C. Public Confidence in the Courts
Another state interest might be found in the need to preserve an
image of the courts as neutral and impartial arbiters of society's disputes.
If the public believes that trials are slanted or unfair, there might be more
resort to self-help or extra-legal remedies, rather than lawsuits, as well as
destructive expressions of frustration with unfair verdicts. Citizens may
also be less inclined to obey the orders of a biased court.
Public confidence analysis is complicated by the fact that the same
legal rule might have different effects on the confidence of the parties,
the jury, and the outside world. A rule empowering defendants to remove any juror they wish, for any reason, would certainly give defendants
more confidence in the jury's verdict. The victim's relatives, though,
would be equally likely to have the opposite reaction. To the extent that
public confidence encompasses only observers with a personal interest in
the outcome of the trial, expansion or contraction of the exclusionary
power is often a wash. In other cases, although there is no private party
with contrary fairness expectations, the public at large has certain moral
147. See supra notes 74-94 and accompanying text. It is worth emphasizing that this
conclusion is limited to the area of capital sentencing. For other jury verdicts-where the
law is more determinate, or the rule-of-law considerations stronger-one might well
conclude that nullification does not fit United States law.
148. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423 (1985). In contrast, there is probably a
reasonable argument that the kind of purely personal policy decisions described by Hart
are not law. On the other hand, in a common law system, these policy decisions are likely
to become law for the next generation of interpreters. Jurors, however, are not like
common law judges; they are not bound by decisions made by previous decisionmakers in
comparable circumstances.
149. Cf. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 197 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("Representing the conscience of the community, the jurors at both stages 'unavoidably
exercise a range ofjudgment and discretion while remaining true to their instructions and
their oaths.'" (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 46 (1980))); State v. Steckel, 708 A.2d
994, 1002 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996) (noting that jurors express their personal feelings in the
process of balancing aggravating and mitigating factors); State v. Nichols, 877 S.W.2d 722,
731 (Tenn. 1994) (holding that as long as jury finds that defendant is statutorily deatheligible, it is free to employ any other factor in evaluating decision to recommend death).
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expectations it expects the courts to vindicate. Thus, the Court prohibits
parties from peremptorily striking female or black jurors, even though
have real and statistically identifiable
these demographic groups might
150
tendencies in particular cases.
Under these guidelines, confidence in the courts is actually maximized by prohibiting, rather than allowing, the for-cause exclusion of
"substantially impaired" jurors. Some commentators have suggested that
denying political privileges to identifiable political-as opposed to racial
or gender-groups is as damaging to public confidence as racial exclusion. 15 a In this case, though, the damage to public confidence is unlikely
to be severe, since the "groups" being excluded are not as easily identified-generally, the stubborn subsets of certain religions, plus an assortment of politically motivated persons who may or may not be correlated
with certain traditionally disadvantaged populations. 15 2 Even so, the jurors who are actually excluded are aware of the discrimination directed at
them, and their own confidence might be damaged. In the long run,
they represent a much bigger group than the litigants, even if their interthe state's confidence interest
est itself is less powerful. So, on balance,
153
probably argues against exclusion.
CONCLUSION

This Note has argued that it violates the First Amendment to exclude
potential jurors whose religious beliefs make them substantially likely either to impose or refuse to impose the death penalty. That determination probably rests, most of all, on whether or not Employment Division v.
Smith will guide the free exercise analysis. Even assuming that Smith does
not govern, a defendant or juror resisting exclusion would need to show
that, unlike jurors who would "automatically" reach their conclusion, a
substantially impaired juror is no more harmful to the state's interests
than any other juror who resides in what we now recognize as a complex
and difficult-to-discern web of personal and moral views about the world.
150. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 149 (1994) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (explaining that despite correlations between potential juror's race or gender
and their decisionmaking, strikes on that basis are constitutionally illegitimate because the
justice system is making "a statement about what this Nation stands for" (quoting Brown v.
North Carolina, 479 U.S. 940, 941-42 (1986) (O'Connor, J.) (opinion concurring in
denial of certiorari))). Admittedly, this might be a statement based on an absolute moral
imperative, rather than subjective public values, but if the community expects moral
behavior from its courts, the result is the same.
151. See Andrew D. Leipold, ConstitutionalizingJury Selection in Criminal Cases: A
Critical Evaluation, 86 Geo. L.J. 945, 986 (1998).
152. But see Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 440, 442 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that
jurors resistant to imposing death penalty are an identifiable group).

153. This conclusion is especially strong if we think that public confidence in the
courts is undermined by ajury selection system that encourages rational jurors to lie about
their beliefs during voir dire.
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There are at least two doctrinal hooks on which litigants seeking to
distinguish Smith can hang their hats. First, in accordance with longstanding legal respect for freedom of thought, Smith might be interpreted
to except from its prohibition on balancing laws that seek to restrict or
control mental processes, even where those laws are neutral and of general applicability. Free exercise jurisprudence suggests that strict scrutiny
is probably the proper approach in those cases. Secondly, following a
suggestion in Smith and Lukumi, we might conclude, as did the Third
Circuit, that where the government sets up a system in which it gives individualized consideration to each person, it may not ignore or devalue the
religious beliefs of those it considers without providing a compelling reason for doing so.
Assuming that heightened scrutiny is appropriate, it is unlikely that
most states could demonstrate a sufficiently compelling interest tojustify
the exclusion of religiously motivated jurors. It might be said that the
goal of voir dire is to reduce error costs-that is, to exclude jurors who
will render factually wrong outcomes. Death penalty verdicts are unusual,
though, in that within a certain range of results, there are no wrong answers, only morally divergent ones. As long as the jury does not, for instance, return a verdict of death when the law requires the presence of
certain aggravating facts, and those facts are not present, there is no "error" to avoid. Probably even for Professor Dworkin, who maintains that
moral questions in the law do have "right" answers, the religious-but not
the racist-juror is "right" whatever her vote, because her exercise of that
discretion is consistent with our legal tradition.
What is more, most states cannot claim that jurors who are ex ante
only likely or inclined to vote for or against the death penalty are likely to
threaten the state's interest in upholding the law. Only in Delaware, Mississippi, New Jersey, Texas, and, arguably, in Georgia, Indiana, Nevada,
and Tennessee are there serious textual arguments that a juror cannot
use his or her personal religious beliefs in weighing whether or not to
impose death. Even in these states, we expect-and, especially in the
death penalty context, need-jurors to make full use of their range of
moral learning. It might even be unjust for us to bar out of hand the use
of a citizen's most central moral tenets, particularly when that citizen is
being called upon to make what the law itself deems a deeply personal
judgment. If nothing else, we should not enact these limits without reflecting carefully on our justifications for them.
In summary, then, it appears that where a potential juror's preconceived notions about the death penalty rest on religious grounds, the trial
court should employ the fairly narrow Witherspoon standard over the
broad Witt "substantially impaired" test. Court would add a question during voir dire: "Are the opinions you have just expressed based upon your
religious or spiritual beliefs?" If a juror answers yes, and seems to be
truthful in that avowal, she can only be excluded if she answered the
question "Could you ever impose the death penalty?" unequivocally "no,"
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or the question "Would you impose the death penalty in every case of
capital murder?" unequivocally "yes."
It might fairly be said that these sentiments, while noble, pale in
comparison to the importance of the jury's sentencing decision to the
defendant. This project is misguided, then, if it leads to an elevation of a
pro-death penalty juror's right to sit above the life of the defendant. It
might be an answer to point out that the state's interest in preventing bias
and upholding the law is much stronger in the case of pro-death jurors,
largely because the juror's textual argument is much weaker. In nearly
every state, and in the federal system, death may not be imposed except
upon a factual finding of statutorily defined aggravating circumstances.
Thus, the traditional fact-oriented approach to for-cause challenges
might be appropriate. Alternately, we might look for states to revise their
statutes to give judges the discretion to reject jury death verdicts.

